Two Naval Battles of Guadalcanal - by Charles Jones

 

Allied forces landed on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 and by 8 Augustseized an airfield, later called Henderson Field, that was under construction by the Japanese military. There were several subsequent attempts to recapture the airfield by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy using reinforcements delivered to Guadalcanal by ship, these efforts ultimately failed because the Japanese never attained air superiority.

 

Allied forces landed on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 and had 11,000 troops the next day and quickly seized an airfield, later called Henderson Field, that was under construction by the Japanese military. There were several subsequent attempts to recapture the airfield by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy using reinforcements delivered to Guadalcanal by ship. These efforts  failed because land based and USN carriers managed to wrest air superiority from the Japanese kept this superiority until the Japanese evacuated their surviving troops.

Meanwhile, the USN had delivered an additional 10,000 troops by the end of October bringing the Marines up to 20,000 effectives which ensured that Henderson Field remained in US hands.

 

In response, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assigned the Imperial Japanese Army's 17th Army, a corps-sized command based at Rabaul and under the command of Lieutenant-General Harukichi Hyakutake, with the task of retaking Guadalcanal. Units of the 17th Army began to arrive on Guadalcanal on 19 August to drive Allied forces from the island.

 

Because of the threat posed by CAF aircraft based at Henderson Field, the Japanese were unable to use large, slow transport ships to deliver troops and supplies to the island. Instead, they used warships based at Rabaul and the Shortland Islands. The Japanese warships—mainly light cruisers or destroyers from the Eighth Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa—were usually able to make the round trip down "The Slot" to Guadalcanal and back in a single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to air attack. Delivering the troops in this manner prevented most of the soldiers' heavy equipment and supplies—such as heavy artillery, vehicles, and much food and ammunition—from being carried to Guadalcanal with them. These high-speed warship runs to Guadalcanal occurred throughout the campaign and came to be known as the "Tokyo Express" by Allied forces and "Rat Transportation" by the Japanese.

 

Battle of Savo Island, August 8,9 1942

 

The Imperial Japanese Navy, in response to Allied amphibious landings in the eastern Solomon Islands, mobilized a task force of seven cruisers and one destroyer under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa.  The Allied screen consisted of eight cruisers and fifteen destroyers under Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley, but only five cruisers and seven destroyers were involved in the battle. In a night action, Mikawa thoroughly surprised and routed the Allied force, sinking one Australian and three American cruisers, while suffering only light damage in return. 

 

After the initial engagement, Mikawa, fearing Allied carrier strikes against his fleet in daylight, decided to withdraw under cover of night rather than attempt to locate and destroy the Allied invasion transports.  Being concerned over the loss of 21 of his carrier fighters, he assessed that his carriers were threatened by torpedo-bomber strikes and wanting to refuel before Japanese naval forces arrived, he withdrew as he had previously forewarned Turner and Vandegrift. Turner, however, believed that Fletcher understood that he was to provide air cover until all the transports were unloaded on 9 August.

 

The Japanese Navy had trained extensively in night-fighting tactics before the war, a fact of which the Allies were unaware.  Mikawa's decision to withdraw under cover of night rather than attempt to destroy the Allied invasion transports was primarily founded on concern over possible Allied carrier strikes against his fleet in daylight.

 

The Allied carrier fleet (under the command of Admiral Fletcher), similarly fearing Japanese attack, had already withdrawn beyond operational range.  On 7-8 August Japanese aircraft based at Rabaul attacked the Allied amphibious forces several times, setting afire the U.S. transport ship George F. Elliott (which sank later) and heavily damaging the destroyer USS Jarvis. In these air attacks, the Japanese lost 36 aircraft, while the U.S. lost 19 aircraft, including 14 carrier-based fighter aircraft. Concerned over the losses to his carrier fighter aircraft strength, anxious about the threat to his carriers from further Japanese air attacks, and worried about his ships' fuel levels, Fletcher announced that he would withdraw his carrier task forces on the evening of 8 August. Being concerned over the loss of 21 of his carrier fighters, he assessed that his carriers were threatened by torpedo-bomber strikes and wanting to refuel before Japanese naval forces arrived, he withdrew as he had previously forewarned Turner and Vandegrift. Turner, however, believed that Fletcher understood that he was to provide air cover until all the transports were unloaded on 9 August.

 

This missed opportunity to cripple (rather than interrupt) the supply of Allied forces on Guadalcanal contributed to Japan's failure to recapture the island. The Japanese attacks prompted  the remaining Allied warships and the amphibious force (i.e. Personnel Transport and Supply ships) to withdraw earlier than planned (before unloading all supplies), temporarily ceding control of the seas around Guadalcanal to the Japanese. This early withdrawal of the fleet left the Allied ground forces (primarily United States Marines), which had landed on Guadalcanal and nearby islands only two days before, in a precarious situation with limited supplies, equipment, and food to hold their beachhead.

 

Mikawa's decision to withdraw under cover of night rather than attempt to destroy the Allied invasion transports was primarily founded on concern over possible Allied carrier strikes against his fleet in daylight. Mikawa was probably aware that the Japanese Navy had no more heavy cruisers in production and thus would be unable to replace any he might lose to air attack the next day if he remained near Guadalcanal.  Actually, the Allied carrier fleet, similarly fearing Japanese attack, had already withdrawn beyond operational range.  Many of these same transports were later used many times to bring crucial supplies and reinforcements to Allied forces on Guadalcanal over succeeding months. Mikawa's decision not to destroy the Allied transport ships when he had the opportunity proved to be a crucial strategic mistake for the Japanese. This missed opportunity to cripple (rather than interrupt) the supply of Allied forces on Guadalcanal contributed to Japan's failure to recapture the island.

 

Battle of Tassafaronga November 30 1942

 

On 26 November Japanese Lieutenant General Hitoshi Imamura took command of the new Eighth Area Army at Rabaul.  On 26 November the 17th Army notified Imamura that it faced a critical food crisis. Some front-line units had not been resupplied for six days, and even the rear-area troops were on one-third rations. The situation forced the Japanese to return to using destroyers to deliver the necessary supplies. Eighth Fleet personnel devised a plan to help reduce the exposure of destroyers delivering supplies to Guadalcanal. Large oil or gas drums were cleaned and filled with medical supplies and food, with enough air space to provide buoyancy, and strung together with rope. When the destroyers arrived at Guadalcanal they would make a sharp turn, the drums would be cut loose, and a swimmer or boat from the shore could pick up the buoyed end of the rope and return it to the beach, where the soldiers could haul in the supplies.

 

The Eighth Fleet's Guadalcanal Reinforcement Unit, based in the Shortland Islands and under the command of Rear Admiral Raizō Tanaka, was tasked by Admiral Mikawa with making the first of five scheduled runs using the drum method on the night of 30 November. Tanaka's unit was centered on the eight ships of Destroyer Squadron (Desron) 2, with six destroyers assigned to carry from 200 to 240 drums of supplies apiece, to Tassafaronga Point. To save weight, the drum-carrying destroyers left their reloads of Type 93 torpedoes (Long Lances), leaving each ship with eight torpedoes, one for each tube.

 

After the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, US Vice Admiral William Halsey, commander of Allied forces, South Pacific Area, had reorganized US naval forces under his command, including, on 24 November, the formation of Task Force 67 (TF67) at Espiritu Santo, comprising the heavy cruisers USS Minneapolis, New Orleans, Pensacola, and Northampton, the light cruiser Honolulu, and four destroyers (Fletcher, Drayton, Maury, and Perkins). US Rear Admiral Carleton H. Wright replaced Thomas Kinkaid as commander of TF67 on 28 November.

 

Upon taking command, Wright briefed his ship commanders on his plan: radar-equipped destroyers were to scout in front of the cruisers and deliver a surprise torpedo attack upon sighting Japanese warships, then vacate the area to give the cruisers a clear field of fire. The cruisers were then to engage with gunfire at a range of 10,000 to 12,000 yards. The cruisers' floatplanes would scout and drop flares during the battle.

 

On 29 November Allied intelligence personnel intercepted and decoded a Japanese message transmitted to the 17th Army on Guadalcanal alerting them to Tanaka's supply run. Informed of the message, Halsey ordered Wright to take TF67 to intercept Tanaka off Guadalcanal.

A Japanese search aircraft spotted an Allied convoy near Guadalcanal and communicated the sighting to Tanaka who told his destroyer commanders to expect action that night and that, "In such an event, utmost efforts will be made to destroy the enemy without regard for the unloading of supplies.”

 

At 22:40 Tanaka's ships passed south of Savo about 3 miles (5 km) offshore from Guadalcanal and slowed to 12 knots as they approached the unloading area. Takanami took station about 1 mile seaward to screen the column.  At the same time, Wright’s TF67 exited Lengo Channel into the sound and headed at 20 knots towards Savo Island. Wright's van destroyers moved to a position slightly inshore of the cruisers. The night sky was moonless with between 2 miles and 7 miles of visibility. Because of extremely calm seas, which created a suction effect on their pontoons, Wright's cruiser floatplanes were delayed in lifting off from Tulagi harbor and were not be a factor in the battle.

 

At 23:06, Wright's force began to detect Tanaka's ships on radar near Cape Esperance on Guadalcanal about 23,000 yards (21,000 m) away. Wright's destroyers rejoined the column as it continued to head towards Savo. At the same time, Tanaka's ships, which were not equipped with radar, split into two groups, and prepared to shove the drums overboard.

 

 At 23:12, Takanami's crew visually sighted Wright's column, quickly confirmed by lookouts on Tanaka's other ships. At 23:16, Tanaka ordered unloading preparations halted and "All ships attack."

 

At 23:20, Fletcher, Perkins, and Drayton fired 20 Mark 15 torpedoes towards Tanaka's ships. Maury, lacking SG radar and thus having no contacts, withheld fire. At the same time, Wright ordered his force to open fire.

 

At 23:21, Minneapolis complied with her first salvo, quickly followed by the other American cruisers. Cole's four destroyers fired star shells to illuminate the targets as previously directed then increased speed to clear the area for the cruisers to operate.  Because of her closer proximity to Wright's column, Takanami was the target of most of the Americans' initial gunfire. Takanami returned fire and launched her full load of eight torpedoes but was quickly hit by American gunfire and, within four minutes, was set afire and incapacitated. As Takanami was destroyed, the rest of Tanaka's ships, almost unnoticed by the Americans, were increasing speed, maneuvering, and preparing to respond to the American attack. All of the American torpedoes missed.  Tanaka's flagship Naganami reversed course to starboard, opened fire and began laying a smoke screen. The next two ships astern, Kawakaze and Suzukaze, reversed course to port.

 

At 23:23, Suzukaze fired eight torpedoes in the direction of the gunflashes from Wright's cruisers, followed by Naganami and Kawakaze which fired their full loads of eight torpedoes at 23:32 and 23:33 respectively.

 

At 23:28, Kuroshio fired four and Oyashio fired eight torpedoes in the direction of Wright's column and then reversed course and increased speed. Wright's cruisers maintained the same course and speed as the 44 Japanese torpedoes headed in their direction.

 

At 23:27, as Minneapolis fired her ninth salvo and Wright prepared to order a course change for his column, two torpedoes, from either Suzukaze or Takanami, struck her forward half. One warhead exploded the aviation fuel storage tanks forward of turret one and the other knocked out three of the ship's four firerooms. The bow forward of turret one folded down at a 70-degree angle, and the ship lost power and steering control. Thirty-seven men were killed.

Less than a minute later a torpedo hit New Orleans abreast of turret one and exploded the ship's forward ammunition magazines and aviation gasoline storage. The blast severed the ship's entire bow forward of turret two. The bow twisted to port, damaging the ship's hull as it was wrenched free by the ship's momentum, and she sank immediately off the aft port quarter. Everyone in turrets one and two perished. New Orleans was forced into a reverse course to starboard and lost steering and communications. A total of 183 men were killed.

 

Pensacola followed next astern in the cruiser column. Observing Minneapolis and New Orleans taking hits and slowing, Pensacola steered to pass them on the port side and then, once past, returned to the same base course. At 23:39, Pensacola took a torpedo abreast the mainmast. The explosion spread flaming oil throughout the interior and across the main deck of the ship, killing 125 of the ship's crew. The hit ripped away the port outer driveshaft, and the ship took a 13-degree list and lost power, communications, and steering.

 

Astern of Pensacola, Honolulu's captain chose to pass Minneapolis and New Orleans on the starboard side. At the same time, the ship increased speed to 30 knots, maneuvered radically, and successfully transited the battle area without taking any damage while maintaining main battery fire at the rapidly disappearing Japanese destroyers.

 

At 23:48, after returning to the base course, Northampton, the last cruiser in line was hit by two of Kawakaze's torpedoes. One hit 10 feet below the waterline abreast the after engine room, and the second hit 40 feet further aft. The after-engine room flooded, three  shafts ceased turning, and the ship listed 10 degrees to port and caught fire. Fifty men were killed.

 

 At 23:44 Tanaka ordered his ships to break contact and retire from the battle area. As they proceeded up Guadalcanal's coast, Kuroshio and Kagerō fired eight more torpedoes towards the American ships, which all missed. When Takanami failed to respond to radio calls, Tanaka directed Oyashio and Kuroshio to go to her assistance. The two destroyers located the burning ship at 00:01 on 1 December but abandoned rescue efforts after detecting American warships in the area. Oyashio and Kuroshio quickly departed the sound to rejoin the rest of Tanaka's ships for the return journey to the Shortlands, which they reached 10 hours later. Takanami was the only Japanese warship hit by American gunfire and seriously damaged during the battle.

 

The battle was one of the worst defeats suffered by the US Navy in World War II, third only to the Attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Savo Island.  The battle was one of the worst defeats suffered by the US Navy in World War II, third only to the Attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Savo Island. 

 

In spite of their defeat in the battle, the Americans had prevented Tanaka from landing the desperately needed food supplies on Guadalcanal, albeit at high cost. A second Japanese supply delivery attempt by ten destroyers led by Tanaka on 3 December successfully dumped 1,500 drums of provisions off Tassafaronga Point, but strafing American aircraft sank all but 310 of them the next day before they could be pulled ashore.  On 12 December the Japanese Navy proposed that Guadalcanal be abandoned.

 

 

 

Historian Richard Frank adds that "This lethargy of mind would not be completely shaken off without some more hard blows to (U.S.) Navy pride around Guadalcanal, but after Savo, the United States picked itself up off the deck and prepared for the most savage combat in its history."